Extract from *Mass Media, Ideologies and the Revolutionary Movement*

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Until June 1971 the popular government faced a heterogeneous opposition, whose effectiveness was diminished by its electoral defeat and by the failure of a coup d'etat. Between this date (that of the assassination of Perez Zujovic) and March 1972, however, the opposition came together in, and succeeded in maintaining, a united front, apparently led by the Christian Democrats. The *Patria y Libertad* (Fatherland and Freedom) para-military fascist organisation, while following a different agitational policy from that of the front, collaborated closely with it and stewarded the mass demonstrations of the Christian Democrat Youth and the Women's Patriotic Front. At this time the opposition still believed the Popular Unity to be in a minority and that they could therefore regain power without rupture. Thus, while never leaving their mass fronts aside, they primarily made use of the classic instruments of bourgeois power, parliament, parties, courts, *Contraloria*, mass communications apparatus, and so on, to fight the popular government. From April 1972, however, the right was struck by a new leadership crisis; the political emphasis of the parties swung towards gremialism. In June the National Party and Frei's tendency within Christian Democracy, though without managing to agree about who should fill the role of the man of destiny -a failure they never succeeded in overcoming-decided to fall back on the tactic of the mass movement and to extend the gremialist fronts, which they had begun to build during the first months of Allende's government. The first national action of this new phase of right-wing offensive was the bosses' strike of October 1972. For its part, *Patria y Libertad*, from April that year, began to operate independently by propagating its nationalist programme for a new society. Later on it launched itself into terrorism, with the tacit support of the National Party, despite the finery of liberal ideology in which the latter continued to deck itself. The second phase of mass action unfolded ten months later, after the *Tancazo* (the failed coup d'etat of June 29th 1973, which must now be seen as the dress rehearsal for the final putsch). This time, co-ordination with the operations of extreme rightist commandos...
was perfect. During the final months before the coup, the mass movement, which had been inaugurated by the CD-National Party alliance, had effectively become the property of the extreme right. The leaderships of the gremios showed themselves to be more in agreement with the National Party and Patria y Libertad than with the Christian Democrats, who still believed in a constitutional `white coup' (golpe blanco). Gremialism, the expression of the mass line of the historically dominant ruling class, had begun to triumph over what has been called `participationism', the expression of the mass line of the middle sectors rallied round the CD. The no-man's land separating the ruling class from the popular masses, which CD utopianism had tried to occupy for more than eight years, had in fact long since disappeared. For sincere adherents to the third position, the putsch was a brusque reminder of that fact. It was already too late to fume against and denounce the manipulation of the centre by the right. Christian Democracy had left time for the ruling class to rearm itself, and had thus opened the door to fascism. We will now try to outline the main features of this dominant mass line.

An Ideology in Action

The ideology of gremialism was essentially that which we saw developing around 1965. By now, however, it had taken a definite shape, seeing itself as a conceptual and practical alternative to the marxism of the popular regime. Nevertheless, a point should be made here. In marked distinction to Patria y Libertad, which from the beginning of 1972 made overt display of the fascist character of gremialism and its own ambition of building a new society under its aegis, the bourgeoisie's mass line did not see itself, nor define itself publicly, as anything more than a means of rectifying the actions of the popular government. It was only after the second national strike, that of August to September 1973, that the gremialist discourse emanating from this mass line became more explicit and definitively stepped across the boundary line by proposing to the masses a global reform of Chilean society, sick as it was supposed to be with the marxist cancer. It thereby displaced and overtook the equivocal discourse of Freism. From this moment, gremialist discourse was ready for transmission to the military, who a little later would make it the cornerstone of the new constitution. Let us look briefly, then, at some aspects of this ideology in action, by examining its rhetoric.14

Gremialist power goes beyond the marxist conception of the class struggle by grouping individuals not according to their position as employer or wage-earner, but according to the profession or activity in which they are engaged. It rejects marxist-leninist definitions of 'the people', 'the bourgeoisie', 'exploiters' and 'imperialism'. What follows is a passage from El Mercurio of 22 October 1972:
Lorry drivers, small businessmen, skilled workers, small industrialists, workers, peasants, technicians and professionals—all these, and others, have taken part in the strike. The social composition of the gremios cannot be described as bourgeois, nor working class, nor peasant. Individuals of differing social status come together in this movement, because the important factor is their activity or specialisation, not any artificial classification of people according to the dichotomy 'exploiters and exploited'.

Or this, published a week later:

Certain sectors of the Popular Unity think that this is a bourgeois strike, carried out by the heads of industry, the bosses. Their marxist point of view keeps them dreaming of the world of English capitalism a century ago which their mentor knew: that of a few rich exploiters and a multitude of the exploited poor. This is not the reality of today's Chile. For years we have been carrying out an energetic redistribution of incomes. The traditional upper class overlaps with the middle bourgeoisie; many workers are part of the bourgeois class; and even the peasants of the co-operatives are tending to become bourgeoisified.

The power of the gremios was thus seen as having arisen spontaneously, as the 'profoundly Chilean' response of the gremios' members after they had exhausted all other political and administrative means of resolving the problems they faced in their jobs and professions, such as lack of supplies, spare parts or hospital equipment, or sectionalism and lack of respect for hierarchy at work. It declared itself to be a new form of solidarity between social sectors which over-rides doctrinal differences. 'It must be emphasised,' said El Mercurio, 'that both ex-presidents Alessandri and Frei have visited the imprisoned leaders of the gremios. These two figures unite around them the immense majority of the nation. Their gesture of support for the gremio movement demonstrates the just and democratic nature of this movement.'

It remains to look now at how this gremialist ideology, when it made its project for social reform explicit and became more than a mere collection of slogans, conceived the structures of the 'new order'. The ideologues of Patria y Libertad took it upon themselves to explain this project in detail.

The 'New Order' of the Nationalist Extreme Right

The main concepts (if one can call them this) of the new society, which appear in all the right-wing media in Chile since the putsch, are simultaneously both national and international. They are those of L'Ordre Nouveau in France and of the Italian MSI, with
different degrees of crudeness in each case. They can be seen in their most deliriously extreme simplicity in documents produced by Patria y Libertad. This organisation, as is well known, demonstrated its support for the junta by dissolving itself three days after the coup ('mission accomplished'), since when its members have been distributed throughout the apparatus of the militarised state.

Four concepts: fatherland- people-family- gremios

Fatherland: The fatherland has an historic destiny which transcends individuals, parties and ideologies. It was forged in the blood of those who died in battle and by the creative effort of preceding generations. The past must not be denied; but it is an even graver offence to compromise the future of the fatherland by submitting it to a foreign ideology, as is the objective of communism, which declares the fatherland to be a bourgeois notion which must be suppressed. Such an idea is high treason.

People: The people do not belong to particular social classes. They are all the inhabitants of Chile, and are identified with the nation's historic destiny. Our people have their own idiosyncracies and way of life, which are incompatible with imported formulae. Communism intends to divide the Chilean people, advocating 'class struggle' between owners-'the exploiting class'-and proletarians-'the exploited class'.

Family: The family is the basis of the social organism, which is why marxism tries to weaken it by fomenting conflicts between the generations, sapping parental authority and destroying filial respect. Gremios: These are groupings needed by workers, students, professionals and heads of businesses to safeguard their rights.

Five objectives

The new society will have five objectives apart from the affirmation of the above. Firstly, to give Chile a functional or organic democracy. This will be achieved through the participation of the gremios, university federations and federations of young people and women. Secondly, to give Chile an integrative state: instead of the state being at the service of one party or class, an integrative state should be built to be at the service of all Chileans. Thirdly, to give Chile authoritarian government. A modern state is a complex organisation, requiring strong authority if anarchy and disorder are to be avoided. Political demagogy must be eradicated, moral corruption stamped out and an end put to economic chaos which only brings unemployment and misery. The first measure necessary to achieve these objectives is to re-establish the principle of authority. Fourthly, to give Chile a modern economy and integrated business life. Private enterprise and individual property are acceptable, with limits determined by the common good, because they are the pillars of human freedom. But the
intention must be to substitute for present business, which is based on the buying and selling of labour, an integral form of business in which the growth of production will transform all Chileans into owners. Fifthly and lastly, to give the people a sense of collective responsibility. This is the foundation of social discipline, without which the economic and spiritual progress of the people is impossible.

*The Sources of Gremio Ideology*

As we have seen, gremialism was born from the response of the Chilean ruling class to the practice of its class enemy. But this response is far from being metabolic. Far from arising spontaneously from within the social body, it has its ideologues who have inspired it and above all who have made strenuous efforts to conceptualise it on the basis of the class struggle as concretely expressed within Chile's specific reality. Two basic sources can be identified behind the gestation of this ideology. Firstly, North American imperialism and its models of free trades unions; and, secondly, the local representatives of integralist Catholic ideology, centred around Opus Dei.

*The free trade union*

Ever since the second world war, North American imperialism has tried to insinuate itself into Latin American trades unionism. Its avowed end has been to `support and strengthen the contingent of democratic workers'. In this task it has been able to count on organisations which are both general in their concerns and specialised. In the United States, apart from the State Department, the CIA and other services which provide training of various kinds, there is also the AFL-CIO, whose views on `company unions' are well known. This organisation's first instrument in Latin America was the ORIT (InterAmerican Regional Workers' Organisation), founded in 1951 to combat communist penetration of the Latin American labour movement'. This organisation now has 25 million members, composed of all the major Latin American confederations apart from those of Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Uruguay. This instrument, with its rigidly cold war inspiration, rapidly demonstrated its inadequacy-and its ties with the State Department-when it openly supported the coups d'etat in Guatemala and Brazil and the invasion of the Dominican Republic. In 1961, at the beginning of the era of the Alliance for Progress, the IADSL (American Institute for Free Trades Unionism) was formed. According to its own publicity brochures, it sought to `utilise the talents and experience of the North American labour movement to combat the continental danger of Castroism'. In 1962, through the Christian Democrat trades unions, the IADSL attempted to divide the Chilean
CUT (Central Unica de Trabajadores - Central Trades Union Federation), which was dominated by the popular parties, by promoting trades union parallelism. In 1966, however, the CD officially broke off relations with the ORIT and the IADSL, while allowing certain of its militants (the Minister of Labour, among others) to continue carrying out their responsibilities as members of the IADSL Executive Council. From then on, imperialism intensified its work in the professional associations, though without neglecting other sectors of workers. Recently it has operated largely through the ANESCO (National Association of Copper Supervisors) and, as throughout Latin America during this period, the transport unions. It is no coincidence that it was ANESCO which took the first initiative in forming, on 5 May 1971, a front of professionals against the Popular Unity, as a result of the claims of the copper supervisors against the loss of having their salaries paid in dollars. This front, called CUPROCH (Central Confederation of Chilean Professionals), which participated directly in the second of the conspiracy's strikes, was led by Julio Bazan, a Christian Democrat, ex-lawyer of the copper corporations, ex-head of Christian Democrat relations with international trades unions and ex-representative of the UNIAPAC (International Union of Catholic Employers). Neither was it by chance that Leon Villarin's Confederation of Lorry Owners acted as catalyst of the bosses' strikes of October 1972 and August 1973, serving as intermediary for the CIA in the financing of the movement. In October 1972, two hundred million dollars flowed into Chile, an amount of money which lowered the black market exchange rate by 30%. Every day each striking lorry owner received an envelope containing 5,000 escudos (about 160 dollars at the official exchange rate, forty dollars on the black market) for each of his trucks.

During the three years of the popular government, the functionaries of the IADSL also intensified their activities within the COMACH (Maritime Confederation of Chile), which became the principal organ of liaison between the civilian section of the conspiracy and seditious elements in the Navy. This Confederation, which was under the thumb of the IADSL, and which since 1962 had been the main impulse behind all the fruitless attempts to divide the Chilean workers' movement, grouped together the majority of the officers of the merchant navy, who, in turn, were mostly members of the Naval reserves. In 1971 and 1972 COMACH received from the IADSL important quantities of telecommunications equipment, allowing them to maintain direct radio contact with ships of the fleet. It was via this equipment that the word was given on 11 September to launch the coup. During this same period, the IADSL - which, we should not forget, is presided over by J. Peter Grace, owner of the W. R. Grace Company, and which has become an important instrument for the defence of the interests of the multinational companies which finance it - continued to organise seminars in Chile for training trades union leaders and to give grants for study courses.
offered at its Front Royal Centre in the state of Virginia. Between 1962 and 1972, seventy-nine Chilean trades union leaders rounded off their studies at Front Royal. Meanwhile, 8,837 people attended the seminars organised by the IADSL throughout the length and breadth of Chile. An indication of the opposition's growing interest in the trades union sector is that between September 1972 and February 1973, the IADSL sent twenty-nine leaders of Chilean gremialism to Front Royal, compared with the seventy-nine who had passed through the Institute in the previous ten years. Thirty-seven of these IADSL trained leaders came from the communications and transport industries and twelve of them from the copper mines. Since October 1973, the IADSL has sent Julio Bazan, the leader of CUPROCH, to Front Royal, along with Manual Rodriguez, the ex-leader of the Freist section of the CUT, and six other leaders of co-operatives and professional unions. Furthermore, the president of the organisation which worked for the replacement of the CUT is an old IADSL pupil who also presides over the fortunes of COMACH.

In the agricultural sector, the ground was well prepared under Frei's government for the penetration of gremialist ideas by another tool of imperialism, equally tied to the CIA: the IDF (International Development Foundation). Under cover of being a private foundation, this organisation, which is based in New York and financed by the AID (Agency for International Development), has since 1961 specialised in questions of 'community development'. It was in this guise that, until 1969, it collaborated with the Christian Democrat trades union associations (ANOC, the National Association of Peasants' Organisations, and the UCC, the Union of Christian Peasants, which combined to form the CNC, the National Confederation of Chilean Peasants). With the objective of dividing the peasant trades union movement, the IDF quintupled its aid to Chile between 1965 and 1968, concentrating about a third of its entire Latin American budget in promoting Christian Democrat peasant organisations in that one country. In 1967, for example, its programme of co-operation with the CNC consisted in training leaders chosen from the four main sectors of the rural population, 'farm workers, farmers, small landowners and indians'. Under the auspices of the project, the IDF, in 1967 alone, trained 1,050 leaders from rural communities (co-operative administrators, union leaders, editors of peasant newspapers, and so on). The same approach was adopted towards cultural centres, mothers' centres and shanty-town dwellers.

The local Opus Dei
The real ideologues of Chilean gremialism, however, those who formulated it and were able to make of it a doctrine capable of taking over the initiative from socialism, must be sought in a group of the extreme catholic right: Opus Dei. The needs of the particular moment in fact offered a range of possibilities to this paradoxical and down-right contradictory ideology,
which is at the same time modernist and integralist. As in Spain, its mother country, this group (which is also called the 'Holy Mafia') is primarily a caste of technocrats rather than a religious grouping. It is intimately tied to monopoly and dependent capitalism, and defines itself as modernising, at least in relation to politics and economics, if very definitely not so with regard to its own dogmatic religious base. Its members are fanatics of technico-professional power: for them, the new politician is the expert. As an eminent member of this secular Spanish 'institute' has written in a significant book entitled *The Twilight of the Ideologies*: 'These (experts) are the jurists, the sociologists, the economists and the engineers, who replace the Prince in the task of preparing the great majority of concrete government decisions.' Or again: 'Success in securing order, justice and material and cultural development at any given moment has nothing to do with sovereign decrees nor majority votes, but derives from the economic and political sciences.'

Present everywhere, and at the same time nowhere, the members of *Opus Dei* were to be found among the leaders of *Patria y Libertad* and the National Party, in the army, and in the Church. Frei's chief of political police was an eminente member. Except as infiltrators, however, they would never be found within Christian Democracy, for which they reserved a particularly ferocious hatred, even if ultimately they were forced to ally themselves with these renegade christians, these Kerenskys, who had allowed marxism to penetrate christianity. Of course, nothing is more easily explained than this hostility, given that the CD had tried to set itself up, however ambiguously, as an alternative within the Church itself to the integralism of the sectors supporting *Opus Dei* and its equivalents.

This quasi-invisible group has followed the formation of the 'new gremalist ideology', with its references to old-style corporatism, step by step. It was to be seen first of all behind the National Agricultural Society at the time of Frei's agricultural reform. It was one of Alessandri's old ministers, the head of the Chilean Opus *Dei*, who proposed the gremio tactic to the landowners-whose own powers of imagination are not of a particularly high order-and provided them with its doctrinal foundations. During the same period, Opus *Dei* chaplains presided over the creation of the student gremio movement at the Catholic University of Chile and certain provincial universities. From the first months of the popular government, it was *Opus Dei* sociologists who took in hand the editorial programming of *El Mercurio*, and directly, but never openly, launched other informational publications, principally *Que Pasa*, the only serious political weekly controlled by the non-Christian Democrat right. It was *Opus Dei* who provided finance and journalists (among them Jaime Guzman, one of the expert jurists later in charge of producing General Leigh Guzman's new Constitution) for the only opposition TV chain, that of the Catholic University, during the
seditious campaigns against the PU. At the famous `pastel de choclo' (minced beef with corn paste) plotting meeting in March 1972, where opposition groups discussed the adoption of a policy of mass action, at least three of Opus Dei's principal ideologues were present. A week before the coup, it was again a member of Opus Dei who, on behalf of this supposedly religious organisation, sold on the international market a quantity of gold greater than anything the market had ever experienced before, thus lowering its exchange rate. And, after the coup, when the Christian Democrats disappeared from the military men's scheme of things, it was the only group capable of lending the nascent fascism if not mass support then a body of doctrines and experts who could legitimate its anti-marxist policy of `democratic reconstruction'.

Nevertheless, the members of Opus Dei are few in number. They form an elite who gravitate to power by virtue of their aristocratic background or their expertise. In Chile during recent years the group has been composed largely of young economists, sociologists and engineers from the 'liberal-mancunian' universities of Chicago and others of the same ilk. After the CD's swing to the right, Opus Dei increased its proselytising among university and professional members of the party who from then on found themselves bereft of a doctrinal credo. Despite its small size, however, it was the only group during the entire Frei/Allende period which systematically set about turning back the historical tide. In assimilating the practice of ruling class resistance, it tried to construct a political model to replace socialchristian reformism, to overthrow marxism and to install a new type of `democracy'. In fact, it went back to Alessandri's old dream of constitutional reform, but this time including increased repression in the mixture. And what repression! To an ideologically impoverished right, historically at the end of its tether, and to the devastating and primitive fascism of the military, it seemed to bring precisely what was needed to fill the void. All this the Opus Dei carried out to some extent within the parties, but mostly outside them.

The Gremial Fronts
To launch its mass actions, the right relied, after the arrival of Allende in power, on the traditional gremios, which were unconditionally at the service of ruling class interests: the SNA, SOFOFA, SONAMI and the Chambers of Commerce and Construction, all brought together in a front in the Confederation of Commerce and Production. In the same way that the SNA had begun its war against the Christian Democrat agrarian reform by modernising its ideology and class organisation, the SOFOFA, which united the big industrialists, and which was the gremio most affected by the formation of the state industrial sector, joined forces with the SNA in the struggle against the progressive forces by avowing a new economic modernism. `In the same way that many revolutionaries take action moved by
genuine concern, so we, as men of private enterprise, have a duty to bring about our own revolution.' This declaration dates from June 1971, when the bourgeoisie still believed that it would beat the popular government by means of the instruments of its own democracy. But, as events turned out, this 'revolution' did not take place in the business enterprise, but directly, in the streets. In January 1973 the president of the SOFOFA emphasised: 'The perspectives opened up during 1972 for gremialist actions on a vast scale are a positive phenomenon, both extraordinary and ongoing, for the future of Chile. . . . We have an urgent and unavoidable task for the immediate future: to aid with all our strength the triumph of anti-marxism.' During the two general strikes, the SOFOFA, together with the other employers' organisations, never lost control of the counter-revolutionary front.

To these bosses' gremios were added those of the small businessmen. Two of these more than any others followed the bourgeoisie through all its seditious adventures and put themselves at its disposition, acting as its rank and file militants, its commandos and its semi-professional agitators. These were the Confederation of Lorry Owners, founded seventeen years earlier, and the Confederation of Retail Trading and Small Scale Industry, founded during the Christian Democrat regime, and one of the only gremios directly controlled by the CD. Paradoxically, when faced by the popular government, the Chamber of Commerce, which for decades had protected the interests of the big merchants, at the end of 1971 merged with the Confederation of Retail Trading to found the National Front of the Private Sector (FRENAP) in order to combat state takeovers.

It was within the professional organisations that the most important changes were to come about. Before the election of the popular government, Chilean history had known no technico-professional front. Associations of doctors, lawyers, and so on, had certainly existed, but they had never engaged in active solidarity with each other. As an aid to reactionary civil disobedience and as a consequence of the copper supervisors' claims, the CUPROCH was created in May 1971, grouping together all professionals from all fields of work. The Confederation of Professional Colleges, incorporating all the legally recognised orders of doctors, lawyers, dentists, engineers, accountants, psychiatrists,' nurses, and so on, was formed in June 1972 and became the most important of these organisations. By the eve of the coup, the National Front of Professionals, which grouped together these two organisations, had succeeded in gathering around itself more than a hundred professional organisations. The explanation for this regroupment was provided very clearly by one of the Front's leaders, himself a member of the Order of Lawyers: 'The need for these professional organisations arose with the Popular Unity government, which has forced their creation as organisations of war, anti-marxist war. We are in a state of internal war; aggression has
been committed against us by the marxist regime.' During the periods of general mass action, all these gremios and other similar organisations placed themselves under the leadership of the Gremial Action Command.

What, then, was the left's strength in these organisations of small businessmen and professionals? It varied widely. The Council of Architects, for example, had a left-wing leadership, while those of the Councils of Engineers and Lawyers were so far to the right that they took part in the meeting which decided upon the bourgeoisie's policy of mass action. Overall, it would be no exaggeration to say that between 60 and 75% of the members of professional bodies were against the popular government. There is no need to recall that during the strike the Order of Doctors was one of the key elements in exacerbating the crisis. For the first time in Chilean history, in denial of all the principles of their profession, the doctors abandoned their posts in the hospitals, though without, of course, ceasing their practice in the private wards. Among small businessmen, if we take the example of the lorry owners, the Confederation controlled only 25,000 of the country's 52,000 lorries; but these included the 3,500 heaviest, those of twelve to twenty-four tonnes, which belonged to the big transport monopolies, who were to be found in the Confederation alongside the owners of one pre-war lorry. After the October strike, dissident lorry owners tried to set up their own movement (MOPARE), despite the Hoffa-style gangsterism threatened by the Confederation and its Patria y Libertad allies. Also in October, the Patriotic Front of Professionals was founded, in an attempt to regroup left professionals.

While it is true that the backbone of the bourgeoisie's mass struggle was the power of the technico-professional gremios, the civil resistance campaign also involved many other forms of mass action, all of them important. The quotations from El Mercurio at the beginning of these notes are testimony to this. Neighbourhood councils, women's organisations, students' federations, and so on, all allowed different sections of the population to mobilise politically on the basis of their daily practice in their places of work, leisure and distribution of supplies. Thus, the neighbourhood councils and the local women's associations, all generally controlled by the right, opposed the JAPs (rank-and-file organisations controlling the distribution and pricing of goods, set up by the PU from 1972). The project for the reform of secondary education was opposed by school-student centres and students' federations. The right tried not to leave out of the permanent mobilisation any sector in which it had the slightest chance of involving itself. During the general strikes the gremios' principle of action was certainly to mobilise itself first and then 'the people'. But during the long intervals separating these general actions, the other fronts determined their own rhythms of activity according to the daily circumstances and events of the class struggle.
The value to the forces of reaction of Frei's policy of creating base organisations cannot be over-emphasised. It meant that the necessary mechanisms of participation were already in place when the right needed to mobilise wide-ranging sectors of the population against Popular Unity. The most notorious case is that of women. Frei's government had inaugurated mothers' centres at neighbourhood level with the objective of integrating women from popular areas into a 'communitarian' society. By reinforcing conservative ideology under the guise of participation, these organisations deterred women from any action or political commitment which ran contrary to the system. It was not until the popular government came to power that the hegemonic bourgeoisie took any interest in mobilising women. Lacking any appropriate organisations to achieve this it had to create them, in order to bring together women from the upper strata and others who had not been involved in any of the already existing organisations. The success of this movement cannot be understood without taking into account the particular values of dominant Chilean culture regarding the situation of women. While this culture is marked by the traditional values of femininity, which consecrate their inferiority, in practice women occupy a central position in Chilean society. The stereotype which sees Chile as a veritable matriarchy is not entirely without foundation. The right knew how to activate skilfully all the factors at the root of women's potential for activism. In the pots and pans marches, the right succeeded in mobilising side by side women from the big bourgeoisie, from the petty-bourgeoisie, from the mothers' centres, and inevitably, from the lumpenproletariat. The left was never able to launch a serious fight at this level, even though the issue of women was discussed in all the parties, and though in the existing organisations the left did in fact manage to take positions of leadership in some women's centres away from the Christian Democrats and to transform them into links in the chain of its own mobilisation.19

III. Agitation and the Mass Media

To initiate its mass actions, the bourgeoisie had to modify its models of ideological domination. The ideological state apparatus-the 'information media'-underwent an important change. The 'leninist' bourgeoisie adopted Lenin's propositions for the organisation of the press and converted its information media into 'collective agitators and organisers', thus demonstrating how the bourgeoisie makes use of the superstructures of the state in the daily political struggle. Merely managing these superstructures from on high, from its ruling class pedestal, became insufficient; it was obliged to go into the streets and to use them in the task of mass politicisation, turning the masses into the active defenders of the bourgeois state. From henceforth these masses would feel the defence of the power of the judiciary, of the schools, of the liberty of the press, of the constitution to be their own concern.
Evidence of this reorganisation of the mass media by the ruling class is enormous. We have already looked at its main characteristics in the introduction to this book. One of the most interesting of these, if one of the least known, is the mutation of the concept of ‘public opinion’ in ruling class discourse. Of course, this mutation cannot be understood unless we understand the parallel evolution of the concept of ‘the people’ in this same discourse.

The Mutation of ‘Public Opinion’

The Chilean bourgeoisie’s mass media, like those of all ruling classes, have protected that class's interests by arrogating to themselves the right to speak in the name of public opinion-majority opinion, in other words. In doing this they merely reproduce the practice and theory of bourgeois public opinion with the object of legitimising both themselves and the bourgeois parliament by giving them the appearance of democracy. What, then, becomes of this notion and theory of public opinion when a socialist president is elected by a relative majority, and where the ruling class is therefore trapped by its own formal democracy, becoming, barring an alliance, an electoral minority? We will try to answer this question by looking at the attitude of *El Mercurio* during the three years of popular government.

During our discussion of gremio power we quoted some paragraphs from one of this newspaper's editorials which was published after the October 1972 employers' strike. This editorial baldly declared that these strikes could not have been the doing of the bourgeoisie, the exploiters, but were the work of ‘the whole people’, because taking part in them were shopkeepers, skilled workers, women, young people, engineers and doctors. This declaration represented the completion of the work of systematic demolition of the concept of ‘the people’ which the press had been carrying out since the accession of the popular government. To grasp more fully this change by which the bourgeois information media passed from being the ‘leader of public opinion’ to the ‘leader of gremial power’, let us briefly retrace the evolution of ‘the people’ and ‘public opinion’ in this press.

In Argentina during the same period, the generals launched the slogan ‘the great national agreement’, cynically taking up the notion of the people in order to pass silently over the antagonism between the interests of the various social sectors that they were trying to reconcile. In Chile, on the other hand, the bourgeoisie chose to reply to the proletariat's pretensions to being the people by trying to neutralise and invalidate the concept, which so much belonged to the popular parties. Finding its role as representative of the majority called in question, the bourgeoisie counter-attacked by making the direct rival of its own 'public opinion'-the people themselves and their class interests-appear as amorphous and ultimately unreal. The bourgeois press programmed this offensive, which was aimed at
restoring its right to be the sole representative of the majority, to pass through five main stages.

1. Introduction into the newspaper of brief ‘class analyses’- if such they can be called.

The concept of the people was redefined. From the outset it was made to take in everybody from the humble fisherman to the chief engineer of the paper monopoly which the government wanted to take into state ownership. At the same time, a slow and sure extension of the notion of the 'middle classes' took place, through which this category gradually colonised and absorbed the notion of the people. By arming its political project with this tendentious profile of social stratification, the bourgeois press turned Chile into a country more or less exclusively populated by the 'middle classes'. A few examples should suffice to illustrate this process.

Many are characterising the beginning of this new period in our country's history as the coming of the people to power. . . . The breadth of the definition of who are working people is very important if we wish to keep up with, and progress in, the tasks facing the national community. A country which loses its technicians, professionals and heads of enterprises exposes itself to often irreversible decline (*El Mercurio*, 3.11.70).

The word ‘people', used demagogically, resembles the elegies conventionally addressed to the Unknown Soldier-that is, to nobody (18.11.70).

In Chile, the middle class is extremely vast. It includes craftsmen, skilled workers, and certain peasants and small land-owners just as much as the highest ranking professionals, experts and heads of industry of all kinds. We must also include in it technicians, artists, writers, journalists and teachers from the various sectors of education. All these categories together form a varied entity which is not defined according to income, family origins or even culture, but by certain essential habits of daily life, moral values and collective aspirations. To this vast Chilean middle class, many aspire to belong . . . In this middle class country, a policy of proletarianisation is an enormous error (9.2.72).

The middle classes represent the majority of the country, because our democracy is truly egalitarian. The strike of the gremios is, therefore, the 'no' of the middle classes; in other words, the 'no' of the majority (29.10.72).
2. 'Public opinion' becomes 'popular opinion'.
This elision allows a gradual rehabilitation and purging of the old concept of public opinion so that it became a synonym for popular opinion.

A deep rift is opening between the Popular Unity and what we will call popular opinion. The PU is a political minority in Chile. All Chile knows this, and the leaders of the bloc in power themselves woefully declare it. But there is more to the matter than this. The PU is so contradictory of its own name that it finds itself deprived of any favourable public opinion. Because public opinion is not to be understood as merely the judgement of certain journalists or restricted circles, it must be defined as popular opinion, the spontaneous judgment of the whole people; and this popular opinion is at the moment very severe regarding the marxist bloc (4.6.72).

3. The bourgeoisie extends its inquiry into the notion of the people to take in every organisation and initiative capable of being related to 'the popular'.
This process takes the form of skirmishes and frontal attacks against popular freedom, popular assemblies, popular justice and popular control.

The struggle for freedom in Chile is between two understandings of the concept. One is of the freedom of flesh and blood people; the other is that of the abstract freedom of the people, which is in reality the dictatorship of a minority. Economic and political 'liberation' thus become a cruel irony (18.2.71).

4. Recourse to a 'purged' notion of the people.
Cleansed of its proletarianising 'impurities' and reshaped by the bourgeois press, this notion of the people is directly opposed to that of the popular forces, and becomes the rallying point for all sectors of the opposition to PU. The passage we have already quoted regarding the October employers' strike is the clearest example. But there are others.

The Communists are always talking in the name of the people—a people which is, made up not of the whole country, but of only those who follow them. This restricted people which has confidence in the Communists does not make up a stable proportion of the country. They are supporters who fluctuate in their support according to the effectiveness of the Communist Party and the Popular Unity (27.2.72).

5. Abandonment of generic categories in its messages.
The 'collective' agents in events covered in the bourgeois organs of information are personified more and more clearly, in order to bring about greater identification of them with
the interests of the publications' readers. The press no longer addresses itself to public opinion in general, to the citizen or the abstract voter, but to the taxpayer or consumer; not to the Chilean woman, but to the housewife. These alterations replace the generalised receiver by target audiences who are certainly more specific, but also less defined socially than their predecessors.

The only context in which the bourgeois press continued with its generic campaigns, appealing to what it called 'public opinion', was that of unusual events such as natural disasters (earthquakes, storms, tidal waves, and so on). The right-wing media used to the full the many natural calamities which hit Chile during the three years, trying to efface class language and appeal for reconciliation and truce in fighting together to repair the damage done by these natural phenomena. The fact, for example, that more than three-quarters of the shanty-town dwellings around Valparaiso were washed away by torrential rain, while only a minute proportion of the houses occupied by the bourgeoisie suffered so much as a scratch, could thus be absorbed and passed over by humanitarian mystification. Let us look at an extract from an editorial which appeared in El Mercurio in July 1971 soon after the tremor at Valparaiso. It was entitled 'Towards a society based on solidarity':

'The marxist thesis held by the parties in government postulates the existence of contradictions in Chilean society which can only be overcome by the displacement of one class by another. Consequently, these parties argue that total struggle is the result of a scientific analysis of history and society. In the political sphere, it becomes ever more difficult to integrate Chileans, unite them around common tasks and awaken in them consciousness of their fundamental solidarity. Thus it is that only a collective misfortune such as the recent earthquake can unite all Chileans ... Help between people is above parties and political interests; it stimulates and mobilises the genuine and voluntary solidarity of the population; it respects the freedom of different communities to run to the aid of their brothers in distress; it is founded on the certainty that this generous effort will solve the most urgent problems of the areas affected by the tremors and bring together the whole body of citizens who are today discouraged and lacking genuinely common goals (15.7.71).

Mass Fronts

The above were the main lines of argument which interwove with one another in the bourgeois press during the three years of popular government. There is no need to emphasise that these appropriations of the notions of the people and solidarity by the bourgeoisie were no mere semantic borrowings. The ruling class deliberately made use of
the left's signs in order to appropriate the right to represent social sectors which had
escape its grasp. The semantic theft was part and parcel of the permanent process of
appropriation of the interests of the proletariat. It was, therefore, clearly also an attempt at
political theft-a fact which is confirmed by the other aspects of the right's ideological
offensive.

This attempt to undermine the popular forces' representivity was linked in the bourgeois
press to agitation supporting the setting up of mass fronts. As it broke down the notion of the
people and redefined that of public opinion, so the bourgeois press also extended and
clarified the relationship between its new clienteles and their fronts of concrete struggle. The
press modified its vertical relationship with public opinion, because it was found to be useful
only at times when the press could content itself with 'informing' its audience. The need now
was to transform the members of this audience into 'men of action'.

The mass fronts thus became quasi-cybernetic means of distributing events according to the
particular interests of each front. This new way of dealing with informational raw material
allowed the bourgeois organs of information to mobilise against the proletariat all sectors
which would henceforth be part of this 'new' people, the people of the bourgeoisie. Let us
illustrate this strategy by reproducing some short extracts from editorials and interviews
published in El Mercurio

1. The youth front.

One of the vital goals of marxism is to conquer the student world. However, their
efforts here are meeting resistance from numerous sectors of students who do not
wish to be converted into instruments of extremist sectarianism (20.10.71).

The actions of the student 'gremios' during this period in our history have shown that
these organisations are a fundamental factor in the preservation of democratic values,
Almost all schools and colleges throughout the country have students' centres grouped
together in federations which now provide an effective mechanism of representation at
the national level ... Heads of families, citizens in general and the democratic parties
must observe with particular attention the development of students' movements in
secondary education, for marxist political penetration in education unfortunately makes
it necessary for our children to use their energies in the defence of the values essential
to their own education (3.12.72).
2. The front of professional colleges

Nobody can seriously believe that the work of professionals can be replaced by heterogeneous committees or assemblies of unqualified workers. This is why the engineers' desire to ensure their role in this system (in the state controlled sector) is absolutely understandable . . . It is made even more indispensable by the fact that the engineers represent technical ability, technological investment, and the possibility of industrial progress and development. It is they who are technically fitted to assume the highest responsibilities in the workers' enterprises (14.8.72).

It is clear that the attacks against the country's professional colleges follow- a concerted strategy of hostility against those in possession of qualifications gained from Chilean universities . . . The Confederation of Professional Colleges, in its declaration, states that any attack against any College belonging to the Confederation constitutes an attack on the Confederation itself. In other words, it underlines the existence of real solidarity between analogous gremios in effectively confronting the offensive to which they are being subjected (23.5.72).

The medical profession is of unlimited value to the community, a fact which everybody recognises. Accordingly, it is accepted that those engaged in medicine should enjoy an income which permits them a living standard consistent with the status their profession demands (An editorial written against the socialisation of the public health service and in solidarity with the College of Doctors - 11.1.72.).

The opinion of the General Council of the College of Lawyers expresses in juridical terms the spirit of the defence of liberty which is at present animating large sectors of the population. The lawyers are not opposed to a system of justice which is accessible to the people and which satisfies their needs. But they do oppose these tribunals made up of illiterates (popular tribunals), and wish to point out once and for all the financial penury endured by genuine judges (2.2.71).

The College of journalists, to defend the dignity of its profession, must give this incident the closest possible consideration, and carry out the measures which it makes necessary (7.5.72).

3. The front of magistrates

Your honour, when you deliver your verdict, do you feel that you are applying class justice, bourgeois justice?
Such a thought has never occurred to me. Our system of justice is based on European legislation. According to the criterion to which you allude this law would also be bourgeois and the property of a particular class.

Your honour, have you heard of the popular tribunals which have begun to function in the shanty-town Nueva la Habana?

Yes. They are blatantly unconstitutional. Are they justifiable from a human point of view?

No. Not from the juridical point of view, nor even less from a human point of view. Legal training is necessary before justice can be administered with equity. A popular tribunal will always be partial, and will function according to political criteria. We, however, are firmly placed on the ground of autonomy and impartiality. And what would become of you, for example, if you were tried by a tribunal composed of your enemies. For this reason I am against them.

Are you bourgeois?

In what sense?

In the sense that you apply the bourgeois law.

I apply the law which jurists and experts have developed in my country. As for my private life, I live with the sobriety of the majority of judges, work hard and have a modest home. (Interview with a judge from Santiago province, El Mercurio, 14.5.71.)

Editorials in El Mercurio Devoted to the Various Mass Fronts between November 1970 and June 1972

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of the press and the liberty of monopoly ownership of the press by capitalist bosses. This diversity of themes is the reason this front received so much coverage.)

Doctors 29  
Engineers 13  
Technicians 47  
Lawyers 16  

PROLETARIAN FRONT 89  
Workers 63  
Peasants 12  
Unemployed 14  

YOUTH FRONT 183  
School students 87  
University students 96  

WOMEN’S FRONT 121  
(This includes also the general ‘middle class’ and ‘consumers’ fronts, which usually looked mainly to women for support.)

The Imperialist Cultural Counter-Revolution

The way in which class confrontation unfolded in Chile during the three years of popular government, and the place in that confrontation occupied by the ideological offensive, demonstrated clearly that henceforth the traditional instruments of imperialist culture would fulfil functions beyond those which had been theirs during the fifteen previous years. The total politicisation of these instruments by the ruling class, in alliance with imperialism, in order better to resist at the broadest and most everyday levels the danger posed by the popular government, is a new fact, and one of which progressive forces must take account in their confrontation with the counter-revolution throughout Latin America.

Not very long ago, the North American advertising industry could satisfy itself with merely implicit promotion of the models of living and social relations inherent in the American Way of Life. This promotion was achieved simply by lauding the products of its economy. Now things are different. This industry now not only advertises commercial products, but also models of political regimes. Before the case of Chile made this change especially clear, there was the role played by Compton Advertising in the planning of the Venezuelan presidential election campaign. Spreading the myth of the ‘Brazilian miracle’ was the job of Kenyon and Eckhardt, another North American agency. In Chile it was the North American agencies, in close cooperation with local agencies, which mounted the psychological, and political assault on the Popular Unity’s projects. Let us take, for example, the publicity campaign launched by the Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (SOFOFA) to convince the
population of the evils of nationalisation. The Marplan division of McCann Erickson played a key role in this plan. A confidential report circulated within these agencies states:

The campaign must exercise psychological pressure in two directions: (a) on the upper and upper-middle levels of society (including parliament) with the goal of obtaining a total rejection of the Executive's proposal regarding the 91 enterprises scheduled to pass into state control; (b) on the middle and lower levels, to demonstrate the prejudicial effects for them of too much state control and to ensure that these sectors come out against the plan, demanding immediately that their political representatives vote against it. In other words, the publicity campaign must mould mass awareness in opposition to the nationalisation project, stimulating pressure from the bottom up so that those representatives who are still in doubt carry out the wishes of their supporters.

The same document says: 'The image of the state as employer must be demolished. The meaning of ownership must be instilled among the workers. This already exists among the peasantry. But among industrial workers it is too weak, for altogether obvious reasons.' Every medium was used. Films were shown in all the country's cinemas. Sixteen millimetre versions of these were made for use in urban shanty-towns, neighbourhood councils and mothers' centres. The idea, according to the document itself, was 'to stimulate interest and encourage the masses to express their opinions in complete freedom. These opinions must be recorded on tape, and the best, most intelligent, most courageous and clearest must be used in the campaign. We must not forget for a moment that it is the voice of the people which must be heard.' This 'mass penetration' was also carried out through pamphlets and even photo-romances: 'thanks to the participation of distinguished artists from the National Theatre, radio, singing stars, etc . . . we can tell very popular stories, with dramatic impact and containing the message of our campaign, so that through this very popular medium the message can be strongly engraved on the minds of people from the lowest social strata, socio-culturally speaking.' The failure of these campaigns, however, had to be recognised by the McCann-Erickson agency itself in its final report: 'The advertisements put out on behalf of the National Front of the Private Sector are producing an effect contrary to that expected; far from developing awareness and clinching unity against state control, it could be said that they are making people want it more.'

Such publicity campaigns show the strong determination of the Chilean bourgeoisie and imperialism not to leave any single area of their political strategy to chance. In the newspapers, women's magazines and young people's publications controlled by the right,
groups of experts from many disciplines, including psychologists and sociologists, were set to work, orienting and shaping content which had previously been left to the intuition of the system's journalists. It is also significant that during these three years the USIA dropped its traditional propaganda methods, and instead distributed its money and men among all the reactionary radio stations, publications and television networks. For example, material arrived for the administration of Channel 13 from the supposed television section of a North American university centre. After investigation, the left workers of Channel 13 discovered that the centre did not exist and that the sender's address hid the identity of whoever had really sent the material.

The ideological offensive mounted against the Popular Unity government from outside the country also demonstrated the strategic importance of the mass media bosses' contacts in Latin America. The campaigns which aimed at creating the image of a socialist Chile racked by chaos and disorder were the work of these contacts. A particularly crucial role in the creation of unfavourable international public opinion was played by the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA). This organisation was originally conceived by the State Department in 1950 as a means of grouping together the owners of the North American mass media and their local counterparts. Its avowed aim was to defend press freedom and the free exercise of the profession in Latin America. Thus, significantly, during the three years of the Popular Unity, more than a hundred protests appeared, reproduced in all the publications put out by these Latin American and North American associates, attacking the government's supposed Violations of press freedom. In fact, as is well known, the opposition kept all its media intact throughout the three years, and in fact increased their strength. After the coup, however, when in the space of one hour all the left media were confiscated or simply destroyed, there was not a murmur from the IAPA. Neither had the IAPA ever once raised its Voice against Batista's dictatorship in Cuba. Among the personalities granted the honour of presiding over the destiny of this body during recent years have been North Americans such as Jack Howard, one of the owners of the international press agency UPI, and Latin Americans such as Agustin Edwards, owner of El Mercurio in Chile (IAPA president in 1969) and Mesquito Neto, owner of O Estado of Sao Paulo, Brazil, whose chain received a loan from the Eximbank in 1972 of around a million dollars to renew its presses. (One year previously, the Eximbank had refused President Allende a loan to allow him to buy spare parts for the Chilean airline's Boeings). At the present moment, the IAPA groups together more than 800 newspaper and magazine owners, of whom 60% are North American. But North American influence does not stop there. Four of the six members of the Board of Directors, ten of the eighteen members of the executive committee and thirteen of the twenty members of the consultative committee are North American. The proprietors of UPI, who own thirty-two
newspapers, eight magazines, several television and radio stations in the United States, and a comics distribution network (United Features), as well as interests in the Hilton international hotel chain and the TWA airline, are represented not by one person but by four, acting in the name of each of the consortium's divisions (to give an idea of UPI's power, suffice it to say that they control 6,500 journalistic businesses, of which 2,000 are situated outside the US). The Hearst chain, absolute masters of Kings Features Syndicate, have two representatives. And so on. Knight - the owner of the *Miami Herald*, which gives more coverage to Latin American issues than any other publication in the United States, and controls eleven newspapers, five magazines, a transport company, a press accessories company, an advertising agency and several TV and radio stations - also has two. Beside the power of these North American groups, the monopolies of the local bourgeoisies, 'associated independently', look pretty wretched. Their dependency emerges even more clearly when it is realised that they are also sleeping partners of the North American paper manufacturing trusts, and only on this basis are able to publish their papers at all (in Chile the famous Crown Zellerbach paper manufacturers own a proportion of the paper monopoly's shares), and that they are also dependent on grants given by the Ford Foundation to send their journalists for final training at the IAPA technical centres in Miami.

The struggle against the Chile of Popular Unity also gave North American imperialism the opportunity to institute new methods of espionage. At the beginning of 1973, at Fort Buchanan in Puerto Rico, the United States Army constructed a secret communications complex which allowed them to intercept information coming from Latin America, principally from Chile. All Chilean radio and television programmes where leaders of the left appeared were intercepted and systematically analysed by computers and specialists in psychopolitical warfare.

From the moment when it saw that it might lose control of the streets, which the left had let slip away from itself from the beginning ('At the beginning of the first year, the reactionaries learned more rapidly than the masses', said Fidel Castro during his Visit to Chile), the ruling class threw the democratic trappings of its mass line to the winds, and opened the door to the military. It realised that without the army its own mass line was being shown up as a 'paper tiger' in the face of the growing mass line of the popular forces.

One of the first decrees of the junta's Military Council for Telecommunications suppressed all programmes 'with content' (sic). At the same time that it was expropriating all the left's media and withdrawing from all others the freedom to transmit information or make interviews without going through the censor, the junta decreed:
1. That commercial advertising without political content is permitted.

2. Programmes dealing with sports and similar events may be transmitted.

3. Dramatic broadcasts and other fiction programmes must contain moral concepts which do not damage morality and high principles and which do not exalt morbidity. They must not be based on the situation the country is living through.

4. The remainder of programmes must be concerned fundamentally with transmitting the culture of our people and emphasising the values of nationality. The transmission of good Chilean music is especially recommended.21

'They have broken the joints of my fingers with sticks, to prevent me from playing the guitar ever again' (Victor Jara, popular singer and theatrical producer, murdered by fascism on 14 September 1973 in the National Stadium).

Notes

1. Edmundo Perez Zújovic had been Frei's Minister of the Interior, and as such had earned himself an unenviable reputation as a result, among other things, of his repression of demonstrations by shanty-town dwellers in which several died. He was assassinated by members of a tiny ultra-leftist group, the VOP (Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo-the Organised Vanguard of the People). The killing, which was condemned by the whole left, including the MIR, provided useful propaganda material for the right in its attacks on 'extremism' and the government's supposedly soft handling of it. (Translator's note.)

2. General Control, or Comptroller: an institution presided over by a Comptroller General elected for life. In theory it was concerned only with the fiscal supervision of the state's activities, but in fact showed an increasing tendency to become a state within a state. Cf. A. Novoa Monreal, 'Chili, le difficile chemin de la légalité', Paris, Politique Aujourd'hui, 1973, no. 3, p. 78.

3. This is a resume of a study being carried out currently of texts on gremial power which appeared in El Mercurio during October 1972.

4. The new constitution envisaged by the generals seeks to institutionalise such forces and create the new society in their image. Here, for example, in his own jargon, Leigh defines his constitutional intentions:

   For me, gremialism is the grouping together of the professional workers, employees, according to their sector of specialisation, with the sole objective of improving their social conditions, but without neglecting the ideas and support they must lend to the community. These are the gremialists. When I use the term, I am not talking about political gremialism. That was the instrument used by the political parties to amass greater support for purely political ends. True gremialism is that which groups together the workers in their specialisation and in their sector. The gremios of transport, of construction, of the professional colleges and others are the true gremios.

   But all those who have been tested in the resistance to the marxist government must be rewarded:

   Woman, throughout the marxist period, has played a role of primary importance ... She has given us, the men, a real lesson. She never lowered her head to accept what she did not want; she showed herself to be indomitable and prepared to defend what was just. We want her to participate in the administration of the country. She will play a very important role, just as much as the gremios and the armed forces.

   (For an evaluation of how these intentions have turned out since, cf. A. Mattelart, 'Notes on the ideology of the military state' in Communications and Class Struggles (A. Mattelart and S. Siegelomb eds.), New York, International General, 1978-translator's note.)
The Mass Media and the ‘Mass Line’ of the Bourgeoisie


On the role of the AIFLD, cf. the denunciations made by North American labour union leaders in *An Analysis of our AFL-CIO Role in Latin America*, Emergency Committee to Defend Democracy in Chile, San Jose, California, 1974; North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), 'Facing the blockade', *Latin America and Empire Report*, VII, 1 (reprinted in Chile Now, NACLA, 1972).


7. This was a meeting of thirty-three businessmen, financiers and opposition politicians held at El Arroyo at Chinigüe, an agreeable small-holding in the countryside belonging to Sergio Silva Bascunan, the ex-President of the Confederation of Production and Commerce. Among those present was Patricio Aylwin, a right-wing leader of the Christian Democrats. The meeting, which caused an outcry when it was revealed to have taken place, came to be named after one of the dishes served during it. (Translator's note.)


9. United States Information Agency, which depends in the same way as the CIA directly on the State Department and the Security Council, and operates from local American embassies.